John Gay

As to the former, some have placed it in acting agreeably to Nature, or Reaſon; others in the Fitneſs of things; others in a Conformity with Truth; others in promoting the Common Good; others in the Will of God, &c. This Diſagreement of Moraliſts concerning the Rule or Criterion of Virtue in general, and at the ſame time their almoſt perfect Agreement concerning the particular Branches of it, would be apt to make one ſuſpect , either that they had a different Criterion (tho' they did not know or attend to it) from what they [p. xii] profeſs'd, or (which perhaps is the true as well as the more favourable Opinion) that they only talk a different Language, and that all of them have the ſame Criterion in reality, only they have expreſs’d it in different Words.

And there will appear the more room for this Conjecture, if we conſider the Ideas themselves about which Morality is chiefly conversant, viz. that they are all mixed Modes, or compound Ideas arbitrarily put together, having at firſt no Archetype or Original exiſting, and afterwards no other than that which exiſts in other Men's Minds. Now ſince Men, unleſs they have theſe their compound Ideas, which are ſignify'd by the ſame Name, made up preciſely of the ſame ſimple ones, muſt neceſſarily talk a different Language; and ſince this difference is ſo difficult, and in ſome Cases impoſſible to be avoided, it follows that greater Allowance and Indulgence ought to be given to theſe Writers than any other: and that (if we have a mind to underſtand them) we ſhould not always take their Words in the common Acceptation, but in the Senſe in which we find that particular Author which we are reading uſed them. And if a Man interpret the Writers of Morality with this due Candor, I believe their ſeeming Inconſiſtencies and Diſagreements about the Criterion of Virtue, would in a great measure vaniſh; and he would find that acting agreeably to Nature, or Reafon, (when rightly underſtood) would perfectly coincide with the Fitneſs of things; the Fitneſs of things (as far as theſe Words have any meaning) with Truth; Truth with the Common Good; and the Common Good with the Will of God.

But whether this Difference be real, or only verbal, a Man can ſcarcely avoid obſerving from it, that Mankind have the Ideas of moſt particular Virtues, and alſo a confuſed Notion of Virtue in general, before they have any Notion of the Criterion of it, or ever did, neither perhaps can they, deduce all or any of thoſe Virtues from their Idea of Virtue in general, or upon any rational Grounds ſhow how thoſe Actions (which the World call Moral, and moſt, if not all Men evidently have Ideas of) are diſtinguiſhed from other Actions, or why they approve of thoſe Actions called Moral ones, more than others.

[p. xiii] But ſince the Idea of Virtue among all Men (however they differ in other reſpects) includes either tacitly or expreſsly, not only the Idea of Approbation as the Conſequence of it but alſo that it is to every one, and in all Circumſtances, an Object of Choice; it is incumbent on all Writers of Morality, to ſhow that that in which they place Virtue, whatever it be, not only always will or ought to meet with Approbation, but alſo that it is always an Object of Choice; which is the other great Diſpute among Moraliſts, viz. What is the Principle or Motive by which Men are induced to purſue Virtue,

For ſome have imagined that that is the only Object of Choice to a rational Creature, which upon the whole will produce more Happineſs than Miſery to the Chooſer; and that Men are and ought to be guided wholly by this Principle; and further, that Virtue will produce more Happineſs than Miſery, and therefore is always an Object of Choice: and whatever is an Object of Choice, that we approve of.

But this, however true in Theory, is inſufficient to account for Matter of Fact, i.e. that the generality of Mankind do approve of Virtue, or rather virtuous Actions, without being able to give any Reaſon for their Approbation; and alſo, that ſome purſue it without knowing that it tends to their own private Happineſs; nay even when it appears to be inconſiſtent with and deſtructive of their Happineſs.

And that this is matter of Fact, the ingenious Author of the Enquiry into the Original of our Idea of Virtue has ſo evidently made appear by a great Variety of Inſtances, that a Man muſt be either very little acquainted with the World, or a mere Hobbeſian in his Temper to deny it.

And therefore to ſolve theſe two Difficulties, this excellent Author has ſuppoſed (without proving, unleſs by ſhowing the inſufficiency of all other ſchemes) a Moral Senſe to account for the former, and a public or benevolent Affection for the latter: And theſe, viz. the Moral Senſe and Public Affection, he ſuppoſes to be implanted in us like Inſtincts, independent of Reaſon, and previous to [p. xiv] any Inſtruction; and therefore his Opinion is, that no account can be given, or ought to be expected of them, any more than we pretend to account for the Pleaſure or Pain which ariſes from Senſation; i.e., Why any particular Motion produced in our Bodies ſhould be accompanied with Pain rather than Pleaſure, and vice verſa.

But this Account ſeems ſtill inſufficient, rather cutting the Knot than untying it, and if it is not akin to the Doctrine of Innate Ideas, yet I think it relishes too much of that of Occult Qualities. This ingenious Author is certainly right in his Observations upon the Inſufficiency of the common Methods of accounting for both our Election and Approbation of Moral Actions, and rightly infers the Neceſſity of supposing a Moral Senſe (i.e., a Power or Faculty whereby we may perceive any Action to be an Object of Approbation, and the Agent of Love) and public Affections, to account for the principal Actions of human Life. But then by calling theſe Inſtincts, I think he ſtops too ſoon, imagining himself at the Fountain-head, when he might have traced them much higher, even to the true Principle of all our Actions, our own Happiness.

And this will appear by ſhowing, that our Approbation of Morality, and all Affections whatſoever, are finally reſolvable into Reaſon, pointing out private Happineſs, and are converſant only about things apprehended to be means tending to this end; and that whenever this end is not perceived, they are to be accounted for from the Aſſociation of Ideas, and may properly enough be called Habits.

For if this is clearly made out, the Neceſſity of ſuppoſing a Moral Senſe, or public Affections to be implanted in us, ſince it ariſes only from the Inſufficiency of all other Schemes to account for human Actions, will immediately vaniſh. But whether it be made out or not, we may obſerve in general, that all Arguments ad Ignorantiam, or that proceed a Remorione only (as this, by which the Moral Senſe and public Affections are eſtabliſhed to be Inſtincts, evidently does) are scarce ever perfectly ſatiſfactory, being for the moſt part ſubject to this Doubt, viz., Whether there is a full Enumeration of all the Parts; and liable alſo to this Objection, viz., That though I cannot [p. xv] account for Phenomena otherwiſe, yet posſibly they may be otherwiſe accounted for.

But before we can determine this Point, it will be necesſary to ſettle all the Terms: We ſhall in the firſt place therefore enquire what is meant by the Criterion of Virtue.

But when we extend our Enquiries after a Criterion for abſtract, mix’d Modes, which have no Exiſtence but in our Minds, and are ſo very different in different Men; we are apt to be confounded, and ſearch after a Meaſure for we know not what. For unless we [p. xvi]

are firſt agreed concerning the thing to be meaſur'd, we ſhall in vain expect to agree in our Criterion of it, or even to underſtand one another.

But it may be ſaid, if we are exactly agreed in any mix'd Mode, what need of any Criterion, or what can we want further? What we want further, and what we mean by the Criterion of it is this; viz. to know whether any inferior or particular thing does belong to this mix'd Mode or not. And this is a very proper Enquiry. For let a man learn the Idea of Intemperance from you never ſo clearly, and if you pleaſe let this be the Idea, viz. the Eating or Drinking to that degree as to injure his Underſtanding or Health; and let him alſo be never ſo much convinc'd of the Obligation to avoid it; yet it is a very pertinent Queſtion in him to aſk you, How ſhall I know when I am guilty of Intemperance?

And if we examine this thoroughly, we ſhall find that every little difference in the Definition of a mix'd Mode will require a different Criterion, e.g. If Murder is defined the wilful taking away the life of another, it is evident, that to inquire after the Criterion of Murder is to inquire how we ſhall know when the life of another is taken away wilfully; i.e. when one who takes away the life of another does it with that malicious Deſign which is implied by Wilfulness. But if Murder is defined the Guilty taking away the life of another, then to enquire after the Criterion of Murder, is to enquire how it ſhall be known when Guilt is contracted in taking away the Life of another. ſo that the Criterion of Murder, according to one or the other of theſe Definitions, will be different. For Wilfulness perhaps will be made the Criterion of Guilt, but Wilfulness itſelf, if it want any, muſt have ſome further Criterion, it being evident that nothing can be the Meaſure of itſelf.

If the Criterion is contain'd in the Idea itſelf, then it is merely nominal, e.g. If Virtue is defined, The acting agreeably to the Will of God: To ſay the Will of God is the Criterion of Virtue, is only to ſay, what is agreeable to the Will of God is call'd Virtue. But the real Criterion, which is of ſome uſe, is this, How ſhall I know what the Will of God is in this reſpect?

[p. xvii] From hence it is evident, that the Criterion of a mix'd Mode is neither the Definition of it, nor contain'd in it. For, as has been ſhewn, the general Idea is neceſſarily to be fix'd; and if thee Particulars comprehended under it are fix'd or known alſo, there remains nothing to be meaſured, becauſe we meaſure only things unknown. The general Idea then being fix'd, the Criterion which is to meaſure or determine Inferiors, muſt be found out and proved to be a proper Rule or Meaſure, by comparing it with the general Idea only, independent of the inferior things to which it is to be apply'd. For the truth of the Meaſure muſt be proved independently of the Particular to be meafured, otherwiſe we ſhall prove in a Circle.

To apply what has been ſaid in general to the Caſe in hand. Great Enquiry is made after the Criterion of Virtue; but it is to be fear'd that few know diſtinctly what it is they are enquiring after; and therefore this muſt be clearly ſtated. And in order to this, we must (as has been ſhewn) firſt fix our Idea of Virtue, and that exactly; and then our Enquiry will be, how we ſhall know this or that leſs general or particular Action to be comprehended under Virtue, For unleſs our Idea of Virtue is fix'd, we enquire after the Criterion of we know not what. And this our Idea of Virtue, to give Any Satiſfaction, ought to be ſo general as to be conformable to that which all or moſt Men are ſuppoſed to have. And this general Idea, I think, may be thus expreſs'd

Virtue is the Conformity to a Rule of Life, directing the Actions of all rational Creatures with reſpect to each other's Happineſs; to which Conformity every one in all Caſes is obliged: and every one that does ſo conform, is or ought to be approved of, eſteemed :and loved for ſo doing. What is here expreſs'd, I believe every one, or moſt, put into their Idea of Virtue.

For Virtue, among all, or moſt, does imply ſome relation to others: where Self is only concern'd, a Man may be prudent but not virtuous; and an Action which relates immediately to God, is ſtiled Religious.

I think alſo that all Men, whatever they make Virtue to conſiſt in, yet always make it to imply Obligation and Approbation.

[p. xviii] The Idea of Virtue being thus fix'd, to enquire after the Ctiterion of it, is to enquire what that Rule of Life is to which we are obligd to conform or how that Rule is to be found out which is to direct me in my Behaviour towards athers, which ought always to be puſued, and which, if purſued, will or ought to procure me Approbation, Eſteem, and Love

But before I can anſwer this Enquiry, I muſt firſt ſee what I mean by Obligation.

This Obligation may be conſider'd four ways, according to the four different manners in which it is induced: Firſt, that Obligation which ariſeth from perceiving the natural Conſequences of things, i.e. the Conſequences of things acting according to the fix'd Laws of Nature, may be call'd Natural. Secondly, that ariſing from Merit or Demerit, as producing the Eſteem and Favour of our Fellow-Creatures, or the contrary, is uſually ſtiled virtous. Thirdly, that ariſing from the Authority of the Civil Magiſtrate, Civil. Fourthly, that from the Authority of God, Religious.

[p. xix] Now from the Conſideration of theſe four ſorts of Obligation (which are the only ones) it is evident that a full and complete Obligation which will extend to all Caſes, can only be that ariſing from the Authority of God; becauſe God only can in all Caſes make a Man happy or miſerable: and therefore, ſince we are always obliged to that conformity call'd Virtue, it is evident that the immediate Rule or Criterion of it is the Will of God. But is the whole Will of God the Criterion of Virtue? No. For tho' the whole Will of God is equally obligatory; yet, ſince Virtue was defined to be the conformity to a Rule directing my Behaviour with reſpet to my Fellow-Creatures, the Will of God can be no farther concern'd about Virtue, than as it directs me in that Behaviour.

The next Enquiry therefore is, what that Will of God in this particular is, or what it directs me to do?

Now it is evident from the Nature of God, viz. his being infinitely happy in himſelf from all Eternity, and from his Goodneſs manifeſted in his Works, that he could have no other Deſign in creating Mankind than their Happineſs; and therefore he wills their Happineſs; therefore the means of their Happineſs: therefore that my Behaviour, as far as it may be a means of the Happineſs of Mankind, ſhould be ſuch. Here then we are got one Step Farther, or to a new Criterion: not to a new Criterion of Virtue immediately, but to a Criterion of the Will of God. For it is an Anſwer to the Enquiry, How ſhall I know what the Will of God in this particular is? Thus the Will of God is the immediate Criterion of Virtue, and the Happineſs of Mankind the Criterion of the Will of God; and therefore the Happineſs of Mankind may be ſaid to be the Criterion of Virtue, but once removed.

And fince I am to do whatever lies in my Power towards promoting the Happineſs of Mankind, the next Enquiry is, what is the Criterion of this Happineſs: i.e. how ſhall I know what in my Power is, or is not, for the Happineſs of Mankind?

Now this is to be known only from the Relations of things, (which Relations, with reſpect to our preſent Enquiry, ſome have call'd their Fitneſs and Unfitneſs.) For some Things and Actions are apt to produce Pleaſure, others Pain; ſome are convenient, others inconvenient [p. xx] for a Society; ſome are for the good of Mankind, others tend to the detriment of it: therefore thoſe are to be choſen which tend to the good of Mankind; the others to be avoided.

Thus then we are got one ſtep farther, viz. to the Criterion of the Happineſs of Mankind. And from this Criterion we deduce all particular Virtues and Vices

The next Enquiry is, How ſhall I know that there is this Fitneſs and Unfitneſs in things? or if there be, how ſhall I diſcover it in particular Cafes? And the Anſwer is, Either from Experience or Reaſon. You either perceive the Inconveniencies of ſome Things and Actions when they happen; or you forſee them by contemplating the Nature of the Things and Actions.

Thus the Criterion of the Fitneſs or Unfitneſs of things may in general be ſaid to be Reaſon: which Reaſon, when exactly conformable to the things exiſting, i.e. when it judges of things as they are, is called Right Reaſon. And hence alſo we ſometimes talk of the Reaſon of things, i.e. properly ſpeaking, that Relation which we ſhould find out by our Reaſon, if our Reaſon was right.

The expreſſing by outward Signs the Relations of things as they really are, is called Truth; and hence, by the ſame kind of Metaphor, we are apt to talk of the Truth, as well as Reaſon of things. Both Expreſſions mean the fame: which has often made me wonder why ſome Men who cry up Reaſon as the Criterion of Virtue, ſhould yer diſlike Mr. Wollaſton's Notion of Truth being its Criterion.

The Truth is, all theſe juſt mention'd, viz. the Happineſs of Mankind; the Relations, or Fitneſs and Unfitneſs of things; Reaſon and Truth; may in ſome. ſenſe be ſaid to be Criterions of Virtue; but it muſt always be remember'd that they are only remote Criterions of it, being gradually ſubordinate to its immediate Criterion, the Will of God.

And from hence we may perceive the Reaſon of what I ſuggeſted in the beginning af this Treatiſe, viz. That the Diſpute between Moraliſts about the Criterion of Virtue, is more in Words than Meaning; and that this Diffetence between them has been occaſion'd by their dropping the immediate Criterion, and chooſing ſome a more [p. xxi] remote, ſome a leſs remote one. And from hence we may ſee alſo the Inconvenience of defining any mix'd Mode by its Criterion. For that in a great meaſure has occaſion'd all this Confuſion, as may eaſily be made appear in all the pretended Criterions of Virtue above-mention'd.

Thus thoſe who either expreſly exclude, or don't mention the Will of God, making the immediate Criterion of Virtue to be the Good of Mankind; muſt either allow that Virtue is not in all Caſes obligatory (contrary to the Idea which all or moſt Men have of it) or they muſt ſay that the Good of Mankind is a ſufficient Obligation. But how can the Good of Mankind be any Obligation to me, when perhaps in particular Caſes, ſuch as laying down my Life, or the like, it is contrary to my Happineſs.

Thoſe who drop the Happineſs of Mankind, and talk of Relations, the Fitneſs and Unfitneſs of Things, are ſtill more remote from the true Criterion. For Fitneſs without relation to ſome End, is ſcarce intelligible.

Reaſon and Truth come pretty near the Relations of things, becauſe they manifeſtly preſuppoſe them; but are ſtill one ſtep farther from the immediate Criterion of Virtue.

What has bcen ſaid concerning the Criterion of Virtue as including our Obligation to it, may perhaps be allow'd to be true, but still it will be urg'd, that 'tis inſufficient to account for matter of Fact, viz. that moſt Perſons, who are either ignorant of, or never conſider'dconsidered theſethese Deductions, do however purſuepursue Virtue themſelvesthemselves, and approve of it in others. I ſhallshall in the next place therefore give ſomesome account of our Approbations and Affections.

And as by reflecting upon Pleaſure there ariſes in our minds a Deſire of it; and on Pain, an Averſion from it (which neceſſarily follows from ſuppoſing us to be ſenſible Creatures, and is no more than ſaying, that all things are not indifferent to us) ſo alſo by reflecting upon Good or Evil, the ſame Deſires and Averſions are excited, and are diſtinguiſh'd into Love and Hatred. And from Love and Hatred variouſly modify'd, ariſe all thoſe other Deſires and Averſions which are promiſcuouſly ſtiled Paſſions or Affections; and are generally thought to be implanted in our Nature originally, like the Power of receiving Pleafure or Pain. And when placed on inanimate Objects, are theſe following, Hope, Fear, Deſpair and its oppoſite, for which we want a Name.

Happineſs, not only on theſe, but alſo on rational Agents, Creatures like himſelf, which have the Power of governing or directing Good [p. xxiv] and Evil, and of acting for an End; there will ariſe different means of Happineſs, and conſequently different Purſuits, tho' tending to the ſame End, Happineſs; and therefore difterent Approbations and Affections, and the contrary; which deſerve particularly to be conſider'd.

That there will ariſe different means of Happineſs, is evident from hence, viz. that Rational Agents, in being ſubſervient to our Happineſs, are not paſſive but voluntary. And therefore ſince we are in purſuit of that to obtain which we apprehend the concurrence of their Wills neceſſary, we cannot but approve of whatever is apt to procure this Concurrence. And that can be only the Pleaſure or Pain expected from it by them. And therefore, as I perceive that my Happineſs is dependent on others, I cannot but judge whatever I apprehend to be proper to excite them to endeavour to promote my Happineſs, to be a means of Happineſs: i.e. I cannot but approve it. And ſince the annexing Pleaſure to their Endeavours to promote my Happineſs is the only thing in my power to this end, I cannot but approve of the annexing Pleaſure to ſuch Actions of theirs as are undertaken upon my account. Hence to approve of a Rational Agent as a means of Happineſs, is different from the Approbation of any other means, becauſe it implies an Approbation alſo of an Endeavour to promote the Happineſs of that Agent, in order to excite him and others to the ſame concern for my Happineſs for the future.

And becauſe what we approve of we alſo deſire (as has been ſhewn above) hence alſo we deſire the Happineſs of any Agent that has done us good. And therefore Love or Hatred, when placed on a rational Object, has this difference from the Love or Hatred of other thirgs, that it implies a deſire of, and conſequently a pleaſure in the Happineſs of the Object beloved; or, if hated, the contrary.

The Foundation of this Approbation and Love (which, as we have ſeen, conſiſts in his voluntarily contributing to our Happineſs) is called the Merit of the Agent ſo contributing, i.e. that whereby he is entitled (upon ſuppoſition that we act like rational, ſociable Creatures, like Creatures whoſe Happineſs is dependent on each other's Behaviour) to our Approbation and Love: Demerit the contrary.

[p. xxv] And this Affection or Quality of any Action which we call Merit is very conſiſtent with a Man's acting ultimately for his own private Happineſs. For any particular Action that is undertaken for the ſake of another, is meritorious, i.e. deſerves Eſteem, Favour, and Approbation from him for whoſe ſake it was undertaken, towards the Doer of it. For the preſumption of ſuch Eſteem, &c. was the only Motive to that Action; and if ſuch Eſteem, &c. does not follow, or is preſum'd not to follow it, ſuch a Perſon is reckon'd unworthy of any favour, becauſe he ſhews by his Actions that he is incapable of being obliged by Favours.

The Miſtake which some have run into, viz. that Merit is inconsistent with acting upon private Happineſs, as an ultimate End, ſeems to have ariſen from hence, viz. that they have not carefully enough diſtinguiſh'd between an inferior and ultimate End; the end of a particular Action, and the end of Action in general: which may be explained thus. Though Happineſs, private Happineſs, is the proper or Ultimate End of all our Actions whatever, yet that particular means of Happineſs which any particular Action is chiefly adapted to procure, or the thing chiefly aim'd at by that Action; the thing which, if poſſeſs'd, we would not undertake that Action, may and generally is call'd the End of that Action. As therefore Happineſs is the general End of all Actions, ſo each particular Action may be said to have its proper and peculiar End: Thus the End of a Beau is to pleaſe by his Dreſs; the End of Study, Knowledge. But neither pleaſing by Dreſs, nor Knowledge, are ultimate Ends, they ſtill tend or ought to tend to ſomething farther; as is evident from hence, viz. that a Man may aſk and expect a Reason why either of them are purſued: Now to aſk the Reaſon of any Action or Purſuit, is only to enquire into the End of it: But to expect a Reaſon, i.e. an End to be aſſign'd for an ultimate End, is abſurd. To aſk why I purſue Happineſs, will admit of no other Anſwer than an Explanation of the Terms.

Why inferior Ends, which in reality are only Means, are too often look'd upon and acquieſc'd in as ultimate, ſhall be accounted for hereafter.

[p. xxvi] Whenever therefore the particular End of any Action is the Happineſs of another (tho' the Agent defign'd thereby to procure to himself Eſteem and Favour, and look'd upon that Eſteem and Favour as a means of private Happineſs) that Action is meritorious. And the ſame may be ſaid, tho' we deſign to pleaſe God by endeavouring

to promote the Happineſs of others. But when an Agent has a view in any particular Action diſtinct from my Happineſs, and that view is his only Motive to that Action, tho' that Action promote my Happineſs to never ſo great a Degree yet that Agent acquires no Merit; i.e. he is not thereby entitled to any Favour and Eſteem: Becauſe Favour and Eſteem are due from me for any Action, no farther than that Action was undertaken upon my account. If therefore my Happineſs is only the pretended End of that Action, I am impoſed on if I believe it real, and thereby think myſelf indebted to the Agent; and am diſcharg'd from any Obligation as ſoon as I find out the Cheat.

Bur it is far otherwiſe when my Happineſs is the ſole End of that particular Action, i. e. (as I have explain'd myſelf above) when the Agent endeavours to promote my Happineſs as a Means to procure my Favour, i.e. to make me ſubſervient to his Happineſs as his ultimate End: Tho' I know he aims at my Happineſs only as a means of his own, yet this leſſens not the Obligation.

There is one thing, I confeſs, which makes a great alteration in this Caſe, and that is whether he aims at my Favour in general, or only for ſome particular End. Becauſe, if he aim at my Happineſs only to ſerve himſelf in ſome particular thing, the Value of my Favour will perhaps end with his obtaining that particular thing: And therefore I am under leſs Obligation (ceteris paribus) the more particular his Expectations from me are; but under Obligation I am.

Now from the various Combinations of this which we call Merit, and its contrary, ariſe all thoſe various Approbations and Averſions; all thoſe Likings and Diſlikings which we call Moral.

As therefore, from conſidering thoſe Beings which are the involuntary means of our Happineſs or Miſery, there were produced [p. xxvii] in us the Paſſions or Affections of Love, Hatred, Hope, Fear, Deſpair, and its contrary: So from conſidering thoſe Beings which voluntarily contribute to our Happineſs or Miſery, there ariſe theſe following. Love and Hatred, (which are different from that Love or Hatred placed on involuntary Beings; that placed on involuntary Beings being only a Deſire to poſſeſs or avoid the thing beloved or hated; but this on voluntary Agents being a Deſire to give Pleaſure or Pain to the Agent beloved or hated) Gratitude, Anger, (ſometimes call'd by one common Name, Reſentment) Generoſity, Ambition, Honour, Shame, Envy, Benevolence: and if there be any other, they're only, as theſe are, different Modifications of Love and Hatred.

Love and Hatred, and the Foundation of them, (viz. the Agent beloved or hated being apprehended to be intſrumental to our Happineſs) I have explain'd above. Gratitude is that Deſire of promoting the Happineſs of another upon account of ſome former Kindneſs receiv'd. Anger, that Deſire of thwarting the Happineſs of another, on account of ſome former Diſkindneſs or Injury received. And both theſe rake place, tho' we hope for, or fear nothing farther from the Objects of either of them, and this is Rill conſiſtent with afing upen a Principle of private Happineſs.

For tho' we neither hope for, nor fear any thing farther from theſe particular Beings; yet the Diſpoſition ſhewn upon theſe Occafions is apprehended to influence the Behaviour of other Beings towards us; i.e. other Beings will be moved to promote our Happineſs or otherwiſe, as they obſerve how we reſent Favours or Injuries.

Ambition is a Deſire of being eſteem'd. Hence a Deſire of being thought an Object of Eſteem; hence of being an Objett of Eſteem, hence of doing laudable, i.e. uſeful Actions. Generoſity and Benevolence are Species of it. Ambition in too great a Degree is called Pride, of which there are ſeveral Species. The Title to the Eſteem of others, which ariſeth from any meritorious Action, is called Honour. The Pleaſure ariſing from Honour being paid to vs, i.e. from others acknowledging that we are entitled to their Eſteem, is without [p. xxviii] a Name, Modeſty is the fear of loſing Eſteem. The Uneaſineſs or Paſſion which ariſeth from a Senſe that we have loſt it, is called Shame. So that Ambition, and all thoſe other Paſſions and Affections belonging to it, together with Shame, ariſe from the Eſteem of others: which is the Reaſon why this Tribe of Affections operate more ſtrongly on us than any other, viz. becauſe we perceive that as our Happineſs is dependent on the Behaviour of others, ſo we perceive alſo that that Behaviour is dependent on the Eſteem which others have conceiv'd of us; and conſequently that our acquiring or loſing Eſteem, is in effect acquiring or loſing Happineſs, and in the higheſt Degree. And the ſame may be faid concerning all our other Affetions and Paſſions, to enumerate which, what for want of Names to them, and what by the confuſion of Language about them, is almoſt impoſſible.

Envy will be accounted for hereafter, for a Reaſon which will then be obvious.

Thus having explain'd what I mean by Obligation and Approbation; and ſhewn that they are founded on and terminate in Happineſs: having alſo pointed out the Difference berween our Approbations and Affections as placed on involuntary and voluntary Means of Happineſs; and farther, that theſe Approbations and Affections are not innate or implanted in us by way of Instinct, bur are all acquired, being fairly deducible from ſuppoſing only ſenſible and rational Creatures dependent on each other for their Happineſs, as explain'd above: I ſhall in the next place endeavour to anſwer a grand Objecion to what has here been ſaid concerning Approbations and Affections ariſing from a proſpect of private Happineſs.

The Objection is this.

The Reaſon or End of every Action is always known to the Agent; for nothing can move a Man but what is perceiv'd: but the generality of Mankind love and hate, approve and diſapprove, immediately, as ſoon as any moral Character either occurs in Life, or is propoſed to them, without conſidering whether their private Happineſs [p. xxix] is affected with it, or no: or if they do conſider any Moral Character in relation to their own Happineſs, and find themſelves, as to their private Happineſs, unconcern'd in it, or even find their private Happineſs leſſen'd by it in ſome particular Inſtance, yet they ſtill approve the Moral Character, and love the Agent; nay they cannot do otherwiſe. Whatever Reaſon may be aſſign'd by ſpeculative Men why we ſhould be grateful to a Benefactor, or pity the Diſtreſſed; yer if the grateful or compaſſionate Mind never thought of that Reaſon, it is no Reaſon to him. The Enquiry is not why he ought to be grateful, but why he is ſo. Theſe after-reaſons therefore rather ſhew the Wiſdom and Providence of our Maker in implanting the immediate Powers of theſe Approbations (i.e. in Mr. Hutcheſon's Language, a Moral Senſe) and theſe Public Affections in us, than give any ſatisfactory account of their Origin. And therefore theſe Public Affections, and this Moral Senſe, are quite independent on private Happineſs, and in reality act upon us as mere Instincts.

Anſwer.

The Matter of Fact contain'd in this Argument, in my Opinion, is Not to be conteſted; and therefore it remains either that we make the matter of Fact conſiſtent with what we have before laid down, or give up the cauſe.

Now, in order to ſhew this Conſiſtency, I beg leave to obſerve, that as in the purſuit of Truth we don't always trace every Propofition whoſe Truth we are examining, to a firſt Principle or Axiom, bur acquieſce, as ſoon as we perceive it deducible from ſome known or preſumed Truth; ſo in our Conduct we do not always travel to the ultimate End of our Actions, Happineſs: but reſt contented, as ſoon as we perceive any Action ſubſervient to a known or preſumed Means of Happineſs. And theſe preſumed Truths and Means of Happineſs, whether real or otherwiſe, always influence us after the fame manner as if they were real. The undeniable Conſequences of Prejudices are as firmly adhered to as the Conſequences of real truths [p. xxx] or arguments; and what is ſubſervient to a falſe (but imagin'd) means of Happineſs, is as induſtriouſly purſued as what is ſubſervient to a true one.

Now every Man, both in his Purſuit after Truth, and in his Conduct, has ſettled and fixed a great many of theſe in his Mind, which he always acts upon, as upon Principles, without examining. And this is occaſion'd by the Narrowneſs of our Underſtandings: We can conſider but a few things at once; and therefore, to run every thing to the Fountain-head would be tedious, thro' a long Series of Conſequences. To avoid this we chooſe out certain Truths and means of Happineſs, which we look upon as RESTING PLACES, which we may ſafely acquieſce in, in the ConduQt both of our Underſtanding and Practice, in relation to the one, regarding them as Axioms; in the other, as Ends. And we are more eaſily inclined to this by imagining that we may fafely rely upon what we call Habitual Knowledge, thinking it needleſs to examine what we are already fatisfy'd in. And hence it is that Prejudices, both Speculative and Practical, are difficult to be rooted out, viz. few will examine them.

And theſe RESTING PLACES are fo often uſed as Principles, that at laſt, letting that ſlip out of our Minds which firſt inclined us to embrace them, we are apt to imagine them, not as they really are, the Subſtitutes of Principles, but Principles themselves.

And from hence, as ſome Men have imagin'd Innate Ideas, becauſe forgetting how they came by them; ſo others have ſet up almoſt as many diſtinct Inſtincts as there are acquired Principles of acting. And I cannot but wonder why the Pecuniary Senſe, a Senſe of Power and Party, &c. were not mention'd, as well as the Moral, that of Honour, Order, and ſome others.

The Caſe is really this. We firſt perceive or imagine ſome real Good, i.e. fitneſs to promote our Happineſs in thoſe things which we love and approve of. Hence (as was above explain'd) we annex Pleaſure to thoſe things. Hence thoſe things and Pleaſure are ſo ty'd together and aſſociated in our Minds, that one cannot preſent [p. xxxi] itſelf but the other will alſo occur. And the Aſſociation remains even after that which at firſt gave them the Connection is quite forgot, or perhaps does not exiſt, but the contrary. An Inſtance or two may perhaps make this clear. How many Men are there in the World who have as ſtrong a taſte for Money as others have fer Virtue; who count ſo much Money, ſo much Happineſs; nay, even ſell their Happineſs for Money; or, to ſpeak more properly, make the having Money, without any Deſign or Thought of uſing it, their ultimate End? But was this Propenſity to Money born with them? Or rather, did not they at firſt perceive a great many Advantages from being poſſeſ'd of Money, and from thence conceive a Pleaſure in haviag it, thence deſire it, thence endeavour to obtain it, thence receive an actual Pleaſure in obtaining it, thence deſire to preſerve the Poſſeſſion of it? Hence, by dropping the intermediate Means between Money and Happineſs, they join Money and Happineſs immediately together, and content themſelves with the phantaſtical Pleaſure of having it, and make that which was at firſt purſued only as a Means, be to them a real End, and what their real Happineſs or Miſery conſiſts in. Thus the Connection between Money and Happineſs remains in the Mind; tho' it has long ſince ceaſed between the things themſelves.

The ſame might be obſerv'd concerning the Thirſt after Knowledge, Fame, &c. the delight in Reading, Building, Planting, and moſt of the various Exerciſes and Entertainments of Life. Theſe were at firſt enter'd on with a view to ſome farther End, but at length become habitual Amuſements; the Idea of Pleaſure is aſſociated with them, and leads us on ſtill in the ſame eager Purſuit of them, when the firſt Reaſon is quite vaniſh'd, or at leaſt out of our Minds. Nay, we find this Power of Aſſociation ſo great as not only to tranſport our Paſſions and Affections beyond their proper bounds, both as to Intenſeneſs and Duration; as is evident from daily Inſtances of Avarice, Ambition, Love, Revenge, &c. but alſo, that it is able to transfer them to improper Objects, and ſuch as are of a quite different Nature from thoſe to which our Reaſon had at firſt directed them. Thus being accuſtom'd to reſent an Injury done to [p. xxxii] our Body by a Retaliation of the like to him thar offer'd it, we are apt to conceive the ſame kind of Reſentment, and often expreſs it in the ſame manner, upon receiving hurt from a Stock or Stone, whereby the hatred which we are uſed to place on voluntary Beings, is ſubſtituted in the Room of that Averſion which belongs to involuntary ones. The like may be obſerv'd in moſt of the other Paſſions above-mention'd.

From hence alſo, viz. from the continuance of this Aſſociation of Ideas in our Minds, we may be enabled to account for that (almoſt diabolical) Paffion called Envy, which we promis'd to conſider.

Mr. Locke obſerves, and I believe very juſtly, that there are ſome Men entirely unacquainted with this Paſſion. For moſt Men that are uſed to Reflection, may remember the very time when they were firſt under the dominion of it.

Envy is generally defined to be that Pain which ariſes in the Mind from obſerving the Proſperity of others; not of all others indefinitely, but only of ſome particular Perſons. Now the examining who thoſe particular Perſons whom we are apt to envy are, will lead us to the true Origin of this Paſſion. And if a Man will be at the Pains to conſult his Mind, or to look into the World, he'll find that theſe particular Perſons are always ſuch as upon ſome account or other he has had a Rivalſhip with. For when two or more are Competitors for the ſame thing, the Succeſs of the one muſt neceſſarily tend ro the Detriment of the other, or others: hence the Succeſs of my Rival and Miſery or Pain are joined together in my Mind; and this connection or aſſociation remaining in my Mind, even after the Rivalſhip ceaſes, makes me always affeted with Pain whenever I hear of his Succeſs, tho' in Affairs which have no manner of Relation to the Rivalſhip, much more in thoſe that bring that to my Remembrance, and put me in mind of what I might have enjoy'd had it not been for him. This may poſſibly caſt ſome Light upon the black Deſigns and envious Purpoſes of the fallen Angels. For why might not they have formerly had ſome Competition with their Fellows? and why may not ſuch Aſſociations be as ſtrong in them as us?

[p. xxiii] Thus alſo we are apt to envy thoſe Perſons that refuſe to be guided by our Judgments and perſuaded by us. For this is nothing elſe than a Rivalſhip about the Superiority of Judgment; and we take a ſecret Pride both to let the World ſee, and in imagining ourſelves, that we were in the right.

There is one thing more to be obſerv'd in anſwer to this Objection, and that is, that we do not always (and perhaps not for the moſt part) make this Aſſociation ourſelves, but learn it from others: i.e. that we annex Pleaſure or Pain to certain Things or Actions becauſe we ſee others do it, and acquire Principles of Action by imitating thoſe whom we admire, or whoſe Eſteem we would procure: Hence the Son too often inherits both the Vices and the Party of his Father, as well as his Eſtate: Hence National Virtues and Vices, Diſpoſitions and Opinions: And from hence we may obſerve how eaſy it is to account for what is generally call'd the Prejudice of Education; how ſoon we catch the Temper and Affections of thoſe whom we daily converſe with; how almoſt inſenſibly we are taught to love, admire or hate; to be grateful, generous, compaſſionate or cruel, &c.

What I fay then in anſwer to the Objection is this: "That it is neceſſary in order to ſolve the principal Actions of human Life to ſuppoſe a Moral Senſe (or what is ſignify'd by that Name) and alſo public Affections; but I deny that this Moral Senſe, or theſe public Affections are innate, or implanted in us: they are acquired either from our own Obſervation or the Imitation of others. But whether I have rightly deny'd it or no muſt depend upon the Arguments, and the Reader is to judge impartially for himſelf. I think this Matter deſerves a fair Examination; and if what has been ſaid already put others upon thinking of it I have my End.